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CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT DIALOGUE (2.6)

REPLIES TO CORY, EL-BIZRI, MOU AND PESSIN
MOHAMMAD AZADPUR

It is a great pleasure to reply to the insightful remarks of my colleagues, who raise a
number of very important and challenging issues, and I hope I can do justice to them
and at the same time clarify some of the controversial aspects of my book. As some
of the remarks are shared, I have taken the liberty of addressing them where I see fit
and avoided a repetition of the replies.
1. THERESE SCARPELLI CORY
Through the intervention of Cory’s comments, I hope to distance myself from some
of the unsavory implications of my position. After all, I have nothing against the
vetula in her quest to become deiform and achieve perfect union with God.
I should then begin with the appearance of elitism in my rendition Islamic
Peripateticism. Cory writes:
Certainly the philosopher works hard to cultivate virtue, since that is the only
way to gain the immortal “acquired intellect.” But what about the little old lady
who is equally assiduous in cultivating virtue? Through no fault of her own,
according to the Islamic Peripatetic model, she is denied perfect union with God
in this life, and loses the opportunity for immortality. [See 26-27 of the current
issue.]1

There is elitism, if the philosopher is committed to the view that people are, for the
most part, essentially deprived of the capacity for salvation, and that salvation is
dependent on this distinction in the essence of human beings. Now it may be that due
to the difficulty in the process of attaining philosophical excellence, few people do
actually attain it; but that to me is not elitism per se. There is a further issue, which is
also pointed out by Cory, that philosophical cultivation presupposes a certain amount
of leisure and education, which may not be available to everyone. In other words, are
1
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philosophy and religion two different projects that channel salvation for two
contingently different kinds of people, the elite and the commoner, respectively? Is
that not a milder but no less problematic form of elitism?
Let me begin by saying that Islamic Peripatetics, as I understand them, by virtue
of subscribing to the idea of religion as revealed to the philosopher-prophet-king, are
not committed to a separation between religion and philosophy, in that way. The
religious law and practices provide the starting point of a training that culminates in
the perfection of the intellect, which is itself a spiritual faculty and of central
importance for revealed religions. Without the preparation provided by the law and
practices prescribed by religion, philosophical training proper cannot begin. Now in
the Avicennan version of this view of religion, I maintain, the cultivation of
imagination can itself culminate in a conjunction with the Active Intellect. This is
possible, as I explain in more detail in my reply to Pessin, in virtue of the training of
our feelings of pleasure and astonishment through the experience of the great work of
art.
So the vetula, in this alternative view, will have to begin with submission to law
and commitment to the practices prescribed by the revealed religion. Then she can
engage in either the aesthetic training provided by the scriptural art or proceed with
philosophical training. Either way, she has to dedicate herself to the project of selftransformation, and her success is the measure of her commitment to that process. I
should also add that the philosophers and the poets-in-training are restless souls vying
for the intensification of the intimacy that is available in varying degrees to the
"faithful" in the various stages of initiation.
Cory also takes issue with my claim that Thomas Aquinas’ interiorization of the
Active Intellect is a source of the divide between religion and philosophy or faith and
reason, a separation that characterizes much of subsequent philosophy. She asks: “I
wonder, then, if Azadpur’s objection is really directed, not at immanentized
psychologies, but at abstractionist theories of cognition. In other words, perhaps the
objection ought to run something like this: If intelligibles are cognized only by
abstracting them from extramental sensible objects (rather than by receiving them
directly from a separate Agent Intellect), then the human intellect seems to be
restricted to this-worldly, empirical objects.” [24] I am not sure that the abstractionist
view can be problematized in this way, and Cory herself offers attractive responses to
such a critique of abstractionism any way. In my view, the problem stems from the
characterization of the spiritual as extra-intellectual and once you combine that with
abstractionism, then all intelligibles are restricted to the material world and cognitive
access to the spiritual realm is ruled out. I would add that this is probably not a
charitable construal of Thomas’s view, but one could probably find versions of it in
of the work later (especially modern) philosophers who appropriate the faith and
reason divide to which Thomas did contribute. Finally, the internalization of the
Active Intellect obscures the incentive for moral and epistemic progress that I discuss
in my reply to El-Bizri’s critique of the Peripatetic notion of the Active Intellect.
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2. NADER EL-BIZRI
I remember reading El-Bizri’s book, The Phenomenological Quest: Between
Avicenna and Heidegger, with fondness as I was putting the final touches on my
book. It certainly illuminated aspects of my project, but it was too late for me to
respond to it in a very substantial way. So I was looking forward to El-Bizri’s
comments so as to discuss more extensively some of the issues regarding our
engagements of similar figures and topics.
I believe that El-Bizri’s critical remarks can be summed up by saying that I did
not quite succeed in showing the modern relevance of Islamic Peripateticism. He
says:
Having said that, one ought to indeed reflect on the phenomenon of the spiritual
incapacitation of philosophy (108); albeit, this can be done by accentuating the
primacy of ethics over ontology, over cosmology and epistemology, without
retaining nostalgic poetizing imagery or reactionary relativistic commitments to
Peripatetic or Neo-Platonist pictures that are no longer sustainable in our epoch.
[33]

El-Bizri’s lingering doubts about the relevance of the Peripatetic moves for modern
thought are especially poignant as I repeatedly claim and argue that such moves are
indeed relevant, if not necessary (in a prescriptive sense). So, perhaps I need to say
some more about this.
El-Bizri finds something unique and positive in the way modernity is as an epoch
and the vantage point shared by modern philosophers. For him, there is something at
work in modernity (what El-Bizri calls “the age of modern technoscience,” [29, 33, 34]) perhaps in the advances that science has made and technology
has appropriated, that is fresh, novel, and revelatory. And the profound thinkers of the
modern epoch, and surely Heidegger is among them, have done much to curtail premodernity’s metaphysical (and poetic) excesses and have gone a long way toward
establishing a demystified view of human beings and their world (while maintaining
as much of the earlier tradition’s relevant insights). For El-Bizri, the claim that ethics
is “a prolegomenon to philosophical thinking” [31] is the only valuable contribution
of my work to the study of Islamic Peripateticism.
A main task of Reason Unbound has been to offer a more general (than a mere
ethical) anti-dote to modernism – the thesis that modernity involves a radical (and
progressive) departure from the past and requires a new philosophy. Now short of
reciting the arguments of the book all over again, I say that my dismantling of
modernism begins with a serious consideration of the primacy of ethics. Such a
starting point goes a long way in taking down a fundamental dualism definitive of
modernism: the divide between mind and world. Ethical training involves the
cultivation of a kind of sensitivity to the moral requirements embodied in particular
circumstances, and once we are able to follow through this starting point, the notion
of a purely causal world that is denuded of values and concepts begins to lose its grip
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on us. The purely causal world is the modernist’s demystified world and its vanishing
grip is a main outcome of the ethical preparation. There are at least two further related
points that I make in my book: 1) The ethically initiated erosion of the mind-world
dualism entails that the mind reaches all the way down, but not at the expense of
exposing us to a supernatural Platonism2 or a mere “congruence of subjectivities.”3
Instead, the concepts, that is, the abilities to cognize intelligibles, are drawn in
passively in our experience of the world and actively in our judgments about it.
Knowledge, that is, our judgments getting things right, is preserved, while affirming
our involvement in making “things” show themselves. 2) Freedom from the grip of
problematic theses that preserve the mind-world dualism is not a merely intellectual
matter. I believe this is a point that that chafes Ei-Bizri’s modernist sensibility and
compels him to call my work preparatory. [35] Of course, one is not going to whisk
oneself away from the bewildering web of reflective and pre-reflective perplexities
(including modernism) by simply reading a book; that is not how philosophy as a way
of life works. My book, as an instrument in the repertoire of the transformative
approach to philosophy, is designed to effect a disturbance (especially in one who is
in the grip of the modernist sensibility); as such, Reason Unbound is indeed
preparatory and may result in the practice of the philosophical cultivation necessary
for genuine liberation and authenticity.
In the end, I would like to address El-Bizri’s critique of the relevance of the
Islamic Peripatetic notion of a separate Active Intelligence. He finds it a mythical
remnant of a bygone age:
One can still evoke the significance of virtue-ethics and stress its primacy in
preceding intellectual inquiry (104) or scientific research. This aim does not
anymore require the continuation hitherto of conversations about an Active
Intellect within our contemporary intellectual settings. It is not also a wellfounded critique to level against Heidegger that he was reductive in his approach
by doing away with the notion of a separate intelligence, and by following the
footsteps of his predecessors that went down the route of Thomism (pp. 105107). Heidegger’s thought unfurled against the background of his preoccupation
with the question of the meaning, truth, and place of being in a scientific age that
is marked by the unfolding of the essence of modern technology. [33]

In my book, I devote a considerable effort to discussing the Peripatetic notion of a
transcendent Active Intellect. The Active Intellect is the actualized intellect, that is,
the intellect that has become all things and has the intelligibles within. The Peripatetic
opponents of a transcendent Active Intellect assign its function to the human intellect.
2

In Mind and World, John McDowell refers to this position as “rampant Platonism” as the view that
the mind apprehends a super-human meaning (1994, 77). This is the more general account of the same
Platonism that he criticizes earlier (in the context of a metaethical discussion) as the consoling myth of
rules as rails (1981, 149). This is not an outright rejection of Platonism, as McDowell also labels his
own position as a kind of Platonism (1981, 156. See also 1994, 92).
3
This is Stanley Cavell’s phrase as quoted by McDowell (1981, 149). I mean to emphasize the
criticism offered by McDowell of Cavell’s view as still in the grip of the mind-world dualism.
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But then it is difficult to explain how the same intellect can be actual and potential
simultaneously. I recognize that the dispute about the transcendence of the Active
Intellect is almost as old as Aristotelianism itself, and my aim is not to get bogged
down in the dialectical exchanges between the proponents and the opponents of this
notion. Instead, I argue that the proponents of a transcendent Active Intellect succeed
better in reconciling faith and reason, philosophy and revealed religion. And of
course, one problematic feature of modernism is its feebleness in negotiating a
satisfactory resolution of these dualisms, and one of the factors contributing to this
infirmity is the apparent unpalatability of a transcendent Active Intellect. For my
Peripatetics, religious expressions are symbolic manifestations of what philosophical
thought aims to uncover intellectually, and a transcendent Active Intellect, for these
philosophers, is not a consolation from getting things right. It brings to view the
difficulty of a transparent awareness, which is the elusive reward (vis-à-vis a
conjunction with the Active Intellect) of the humble and virtuous knowledge seekers.
Moreover, the invocation of the transcendent Active Intellect and the aspiration to
conjoin with it are incentives for further ethical and epistemic progress. Latin antiAverroists found in this view a challenge to the authority of the church and sought to
discredit it. Subsequently, even when the church’s condemnation lost its grip on
educational institutions, mainstream philosophy was not able to shake off the
spiritually inert role assigned to it in medieval universities.
3. BO MOU
Mou gets to the point right away by putting forth a familiar account of philosophical
inquiry and contends that it is more general than the ones I put forth in my book. He
has in mind my appropriation of the competing views of the philosophical inquiry
that Pierre Hadot, in his now famous Philosophy as a Way Life, pits against one
another. For Hadot, mainstream historians of philosophy, when they come to ancient
philosophy, take it to be in the business of producing philosophical discourse. This he
takes to be at odds with the project that the ancients themselves undertook and called
philosophy. For them philosophy was primarily the practice of spiritual exercises
aimed at the transformation of the self and the acquisition of wisdom. 4 Now a central
claim made in my book is that Hadot’s reading of ancient philosophy is the
conception of philosophy Muslims inherit from the Greeks. Mou, however, maintains
that “[m]any think that the critique (taking nothing absolutely immune from criticism
and without blindly claiming anything) and justification (understood in a broad way)
constitute two closely-related (prescriptive) defining features of philosophical
inquiries”. [37] Given this broader conception of philosophical inquiry, Mou
comments that “[a]ctually, both the production of the abstract rational theory account
and the practice of spiritual exercises can go in distinct directions: either in the
critical/justification direction or in the faith-based divinely direction.” [37]

4
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This is an interesting distinction, but I would like to suggest that it is itself an item
in the modernist’s repertoire. To be more precise, this distinction can be seen as a
reformulation of the modernist contrast between faith and reason or religion and
philosophy. In this light, I do have something to say about that account. Islamic
Peripatetics did not see a fundamental difference between the purpose of religious
practice and that of philosophy. For them, both aimed at the attainment of truth
(ḥaqīqa). In fact, they maintained that philosophy itself ought to belong to the core of
religion’s transformative technologies, and religious symbolism and practices ought
to contribute to the initiation of the person into the philosophical way of life. Indeed,
in this picture, religion is not in the business of articulating systems of dogma, which
one believes blindly (has faith in). Rather, “faith,” as Karen Armstrong has pointed
out, is rather to “give yourself” or “commit yourself” to (or “engage”) the way of life
symbolized by the belief. In her essay, “Faith and Modernity,” she writes that “the
Latin word credo (translated now as “I believe”) seems to have derived from the
phrase cor dare: to give one’s heart. The Middle English word beleven meant to love.
When Christians proclaimed: credo in unum Deum, they were not so much affirming
their belief in the existence of a single deity as committing their lives to God.”5 I
would add that in this approach, God is the real as such, and a commitment to God
means the embracing of the way of truth, i.e., the practice of getting reality right. It is
by the engagement in the purifying spiritual practices that we become like that which
we seek to know, and it is only thus that we can know it. The dogmatic approach to
faith, on the other hand, is on par with the approach to philosophy that aims at the
mere production of rational discourse, they both miss the alchemical dimension of
philosophy and religion, that is, the transformation of the self to the point of
achieving intimacy with the divine.
Having said this, I would like to respond to another of Mou’s questions. He asks,
“given that Islamic Peripatetic tradition includes the prophecy discourse as its crucial
portion, how can one look at the due relationship between the critique/justification
character of philosophical activities and the imagination power of prophecy? Should
such imagination be regulated by adequate critique/justification or eventually be
based on religious faith in God (in the Islamic sense of the term)?” [38] Yes,
prophecy and philosophy are different sides of the same coin, and the test of prophecy
is in its philosophical coherence. Of course, we should understand by “philosophy”
the practices of self-transformation for the sake of wisdom and by “prophecy” more
than the foreshadowing of future events. In my book, I spend a lot of time working
out the notion of prophecy as developed by Islamic Peripatetics. The lowest form of
prophecy is the anticipation of future events, and at its apex, it is the direct grasp of
the intelligibles. I should add that in the Peripatetic prophetic philosophy, the venues
of divine mercy are not limited and wisdom and its relevant practices are available
throughout history and across geographical boundaries.6 There are some Islamic
traditions that claim a more direct path, but the Peripatetic paths to truth are as
5
6

Armstrong 2004, 73.
See my brief treatment of Hegel’s philosophical chauvinism in Azadpur 2011, 73-4.
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multifarious as that allowed by the limits of human ingenuity and inspiration in the
quest for the Good.
A third point raised by Mou concerns the non-Peripatetic forms of Islamic
philosophy. He asks whether they all forms of Islamic philosophy by the conception
of philosophy as a way of life. [39-40] I answer in the affirmative. Alternative forms
of Islamic philosophy, like those more heavily Platonist, Plotinian, skeptical, etc.,
also operate within the framework of philosophy as a practice of spiritual exercises
for the sake of virtue and wisdom. This is in agreement with what Seyyed Hossein
Nasr writes, rather eloquently and concisely, as a way of characterizing all species of
Islamic philosophy: “This conception of philosophy as dealing with the discovering
of the truth concerning the nature of things and combining mental knowledge with the
purification and perfection of one's being has lasted to this day wherever the tradition
of Islamic philosophy has continued and is in fact embodied in the very being of the
most eminent representatives of the Islamic philosophical tradition.”7 Different
schools of philosophy in the Islamic tradition realize this conception differently. In
my book, for instance, I draw upon Abu Hāmid Muhammad al-Ghazzālī’s position to
highlight a form of “Islamic philosophy” that stems from ancient skepticism and is
critical of the Peripatetic approach.
4. SARAH PESSIN
I sympathize with Pessin’s anxieties in trying to represent a philosophical tradition
that is relegated to the margins of mainstream philosophy and holds a key to
dissolving some of its most perplexing problems. My sympathy is multiplied by the
historical connections and shared commitments of Medieval Islamic and Jewish
thinkers. My excursion into Thomas' explicit disavowals of the views of Islamic
thinkers stems from my attempt to diagnose a source of the misreadings that affects
not only the Western reception of Islamic philosophy (and medieval Jewish
philosophy, for that matter) but also the contours of the ensuing philosophical
enterprise. I do not want to put the entire weight of such misreadings on Thomas; his
critique of Avicenna's theory of the Active Intellect is not the only source; another
salient wellspring of the aberrations in the subsequent tradition of Western
philosophy is the rise of ethical voluntarism in late thirteenth century, and here
Thomas' own views are themselves challenged and marginalized.8 These are just two
of the more explicit sources of opposition to the tradition of Islamic Peripateticism. I
do not deny that there are other more subtle (and perhaps more pernicious) ones, and
I'd be happy to learn more from Pessin.
Pessin asks “why invoke Heidegger in this project at all?” [43] I understand her
concerns about Heidegger. In a context, where "introducing" the Islamic Peripatetics
is the order of the day, why should they be related to a philosopher whose atrocious
conduct is well-documented and nothing short of appalling? Having said that, I
7
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should now emphasize that I engage Heidegger for three main reasons. First, I draw
extensively on Henry Corbin's reading of Islamic Peripatetics, and Corbin's position
is rooted in early Heidegger. Second, Early Heidegger is immersed in scholastic
Aristotelianism and draws heavily from it in his phenomenology. His aim is to avoid
the institutionalization of Aristotle-interpretation, and that comes at the cost of
obscuring the Aristotelian origins of his view. Thirdly, Heidegger-interpretation is the
site of a fascinating exchange between John McDowell and Hubert Dreyfus, where
McDowell brings to light Dreyfus' commitment to a problematic view of the relation
between mind and world. I especially wanted to seize that opportunity to point to
some of the problematic aspects of the contemporary theories of mind, especially
since I found those aspects insidiously at work in missing the point of the approach to
philosophy as a practice of spiritual exercises. Having said that, I took every
opportunity to point out the unsavory figure of Heidegger and the relation of his
philosophy to his appalling choices.
Having responded to Pessin's initial worry, I want to turn to the core of her
concerns about the various senses of "spiritual practice" in my work. She asks first
"whether the initial training or the resulting phronesis is more properly illustrative of
the ‘spiritual practice’ that he has in mind when he emphasizes that Islamic
rationalism is itself deeply tied up with spiritual practice.” [44] For me, spiritual
practices are only instrumental. So the initial ethical training is obviously "spiritual
practice" in the sense that I mean it. It aims at phronesis or practical wisdom. Now,
phronesis, to put it in a nutshell, is the ability to recognize the good in a particular
situation and to be able to respond to its requirements swiftly. As such, it is itself the
beginning of the process that culminates in the acquired intellect, i.e., the intellect
which grasps the secondary intelligibles (including but clearly going beyond the
moral intelligibles – e.g., the good) immediately. So the practice of phronesis is at the
service of a higher good, and a spiritual practice.
Pessin, then, wonders that if "the source of the ethical training is itself a divinely
revealed Islamic Law, does that not put a kind of Divine Command Theory at the
foundation – and does such a foundation not risk overshadowing the fluidity of
Aristotelian phronesis with a more rigid mode of 'following God’s law'?" [44] This is
also a very important question. Islamic Peripatetics attribute the legislative act of the
prophet-philosopher to his perfected imagination, and such an imagination enables
him to provide a set of laws that are easy to understand and persuasive so that the
initiate can begin the process of self-overcoming. The practices get intensified at the
level of supererogatory ascetic exercises and result in the transparent awareness of the
good that marks the stage of phronesis. The process goes even further as the
theoretical intellect is cultivated. Therefore, the Divine Law, for the Islamic
Peripatetics, is only the lowest rung of the practices that culminate in wisdom.
Nevertheless, it is an essential part of the process of sapiential development.
In response to Pessin’s questions about my contributions to the understanding of
poetic interpretation (ta’wil), [45-6] I should begin by emphasizing that, with
Avicenna, Islamic Peripateticism comes to acquire a further engagement of the
faculty of imagination in the advanced stages of the philosophical development, i.e.,
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beyond practical wisdom. The earlier engagement concerns the divine law. In the
later forms of this engagement, the person may take on the symbolic aspect of sacred
text and cultivate his feelings of pleasure and awe by interpreting (ta’wil) the relevant
presentations of the Good in the text (work of art). As I argue in my book, in his
Poetics, Avicenna contrasts this aesthetic refinement with the refinement of the
theoretical intellect by the philosopher, and maintains that the former can also bring
the person to the brinks of divine inspiration.9 This is the start of the obsession with
the imaginal in the subsequent Islamic philosophers. Also this is where I place
Corbin's concern with the symbolic rather than the allegorical approach to Avicenna's
own efforts at poetic production. As Corbin rightly points out, drawing on a
distinction indigenous to Romantic poetics, Avicenna's poetic treatises are not
allegories, that is they are not publicly available representations of a point that is
otherwise accessible more precisely and directly to the elite philosopher in his
intellectual quest. Rather, the symbols are hierophanies, and their exegesis (ta’wil)
refines his inner life and enables him to become deiform (i.e., attain theosis or
ta’alluh).10
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